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DRAFT 6-27-22
SELECTIVE JUDICAL ACTIVISM IN
THE ROBERTS COURT
Alan B. Morrison1
Introduction
The opinion in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization2 does not use the phrase
“judicial activism” to describe how the majority in Roe v. Wade 3 found a right to an abortion in
the Constitution. However, in three places in the opinion,4 Justice Samuel Alito quoted Justice
Byron White’s dissent in Roe, in which he accused the majority of exercising “raw judicial
power” in striking down Texas’ prohibition on abortion, which is another way of accusing the
majority of engaging in judicial activism. Aside from those who would define a judicial activist
as a judge whose decision they do not agree with, one could hardly dispute the assertion that, at
the very least, the majority in Roe aggressively interpreted the Constitution to reach its
conclusions. According to Justice Alito, the Roe majority erred, and “[i]t is time to heed the
Constitution and return the issue of abortion to the people's elected representatives.” 5
Reading Justice Alito’s opinion, one would believe that he and others on the Roberts
Court believe strongly in allowing controversial policy judgments to be made by our elected
representatives, instead of by judicial activists. That approach to judging is a defensible one, but,

The writer is an Associate Dean at George Washington University Law School where he teaches constitutional
law. The selective judicial activism that it discusses is based on opinions of the Roberts Court that pre-date the early
May 2022 leak of the draft in Dobbs. The Court’s post-leak opinions in Carson v. Makin, 2022 WL 2203333 (June
21, 2022), and New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, No. 20-843 (June 23, 2022), are not discussed,
but would support the writer’s conclusions on selective activism in the areas of religion and guns, respectively. This
essay treats the Roberts Court as if it were monolithic in all of these cases, but that would be incorrect as Chief
Justice John Roberts concurred in the result in Dobbs, but not the decision to overrule Roe.
2
2022 WL 2276808 (June 24, 2022). Citations in this draft are to slip opinion.
3
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4
Op. at 3, 36, 44.
5
Op. at 6.
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as this essay argues, the current majority of the Roberts Court has a very selective approach to
judicial activism. Time and again, in a wide variety of subject areas, when the constitutional
claim at issue aligns with the policy position of the political party of the President that nominated
these Justices (i.e., the Republican party), they are every bit as activist as the Roe majority.
Justice Alito’s opinion has a built-in response. On page 1, he observes that “the
Constitution makes no mention of abortion,” which he repeats with only slight variance on six
occasions. His response would be that, in the other cases, in which the majority of the Roberts
Court supported a limit on legislative actions, there was a word or a phrase that is “mentioned” in
the Constitution, such as the “free exercise” of religion, the “freedom of speech,” the right “to
keep and bear arms,” the prohibition on the “tak[ing]” of “private property,” or that, under
Article I, sec. 3, the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” But, of
course, the majority in Roe did point to the word “liberty” which is in the Constitution,6 it is just
that Justice Alito did not read that word in the same (expansive) way that Justice Harry
Blackmun did in Roe. According to Justice Alito, the flaw in Roe was that it examined the words
in the Constitution at a “high level of generality,” which he concluded led to a vast expansive of
rights protected by the Constitution. 7
This essay argues that the majority of the Roberts Court has often latched on to a word or
phrase “mentioned” in the Constitution, examined its meaning at a “high level of generality,” and
reached a result that took the decision away from “the people’s elected representatives.” It has,
however, done so only when the outcome supports the positions of the party of the Republican
President who appointed those Justices. Of course, this selective judicial activism does not

6
7

410 U.S. at 129, 152-53. Justice Potter Stewart also relied on that liberty in his concurrence. Id. at 168-171.
Op. at 32.
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explain every constitutional decision, and this essay does not discuss every such ruling since
John Roberts became Chief Justice in 2003. But the pattern is too consistent to admit of any
conclusion other than that the Justices abhor judicial activism, except when it serves to produce
the political goals that they support. Judicial activism may or may not be a proper way to
understand the Constitution, but it should at least be applied evenly across all cases.
This examination of the cases proceeds in the following order. First, I review
Washington v. Glucksberg,8 the case that is at the heart of the Dobbs opinion and show that it
need not be read to provide the door-closing impact on a Due Process argument that the majority
embraces. Next I turn to a sampling of the election-related cases and show that the Roberts
Court has failed to follow the premises of Dobbs and been an activist court when it suits the
goals of the Republican Party, but not otherwise. Then I turn to the success of the Roberts Court
in undermining the power of labor unions, by broad readings of the First and Fifth Amendments.
In the final section I point to other expansive readings of the Constitution by the Roberts Court
that also coincide with the political goals of the party whose President appointed them.
One further word about the analysis of the cases below. In each of the cases, the majority
opinion was lengthy, and it covered many arguments. There were always dissents and in many
cases concurrences. This essay does not attempt to discuss each decision in full. Instead, it will
focus on what are the two central ingredients of Dobbs’ conclusion that the Constitution does not
protect the right to an abortion: whether and to what extent the right at issue is mentioned in the
Constitution, and whether the Court should defer to the views of the elected representatives. The

8

521 U.S. 702 (1997).

3

question that is at the center of this essay is how closely the Roberts Court adhered to those
principles in these other cases.
Washington v. Glucksberg – The Basis of Dobbs
The backbone of Dobbs is the portion of majority opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg,
stating that in order for a right to be protected under the Due Process Clause, it “must be "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 9 The

opinion was written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who was one of the two dissenters in
Roe. The case involved a facial challenge to a statute under which a “ person is guilty of
promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt
suicide.” However, another state law clarified that the “withholding or withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment” at a patient's direction “shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide.” 10
In rejecting the claim of the three plaintiff-physicians, the Court identified a number of
significant interests that supported the law,11 while also recognizing the interests of individuals
nearing death who were in serious pain and no longer wished to live.
Although the judgment in Glucksberg was unanimous, four Justices concurred only in the
result. In addition, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor joined the majority opinion, but wrote a short
concurrence that Dobbs does not mention, and that makes three important points. The first
points out the difficulty in draw lines as to what assistance is and is not proper as a reason for the
Court not to step in:
As the Court recognizes, States are presently undertaking extensive and serious
evaluation of physician-assisted suicide and other related issues. In such circumstances,

Id. at 721.
Id. at 707.
11
Id. at 728-34.______.
9

10
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“the ... challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding ... liberty
interests is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States ... in the first instance.” 12.
The second is that the states are already doing much to alleviate the end-of-life suffering of many
patients:
There is no dispute that dying patients in Washington and New York can obtain palliative
care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths. The difficulty in defining terminal
illness and the risk that a dying patient's request for assistance in ending his or her life
might not be truly voluntary justifies the prohibitions on assisted suicide we uphold
here.13
Third, Justice O’Connor pointed to a political dynamic regarding assisted suicide that is different
from the one that pertains to the debate over abortion:
Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family member's terminal
illness. There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the proper
balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent individuals who
would seek to end their suffering and the State's interests in protecting those who might
seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure. 14
Justice Alito read Glucksberg as a door-closing ruling, so that, unless a right fell within
the confines of being “deeply rooted” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” it would
receive almost no constitutional protection. But as Justice O’Connor’s concurrence showed, it
need not have been read that way. Moreover, because there was no sharp difference between the
major political parties over the issue of assisted suicide, and because every Justice supported the
result, the political divide that is an inescapable element of the abortion debate did not affect the
outcome in Glucksberg. But as this essay now shows, that political divide goes a long way
toward explaining the aggressive assertion of other rights by the majority of the Roberts Court, in
contrast to the approach they took to abortion in Dobbs.

Id. at 737 (citations omitted).
Id. at 738..
14
Id. at 737.
12
13
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The Election Cases
In Shelby County v. Holder,15 the plaintiff challenged the provisions of the Voting Rights
Act that required certain states and some of the subdivisions in other states to obtain preclearance by either the Department of Justice or a three-judge district court in the District of
Columbia for any changes in their laws effecting voting, in order to protect against further loss of
the rights of racial minorities.16 The Act was first passed in 1965, and a challenge to it was
rejected by the Supreme Court then, as were the lawsuits over four subsequent re-enactments,
which included certain additions to the coverage of the pre-clearance requirement. 17 In Shelby
County, the challenge was to the 2007 amendments, which had passed the House by a vote of
390 to 33 and the Senate by a vote of 98 to 0. 18
The majority conceded that the Act was necessary when it was passed, but it concluded
that there had been a vast increase in the ability of minorities to vote in the covered jurisdictions
since 1965.19 As a result, it decided that the law was no longer needed, and therefore its prior
intrusions on the rights of state legislatures to pass their own voting laws could no longer be
tolerated. In particular, the majority found fault with the formula in section 4 that determined
which states and localities were subject to pre-clearance, finding them to be out of date and not
justified by that formula.20

15

570 U.S. 529 (2013).

Id. at 537.
Id. at 538-39.
18
Id. at 565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
19
Id. at 545-47.
20
Id. at 552-54.
16
17

6

To justify his conclusion that section 4 was unconstitutional, Chief Justice Roberts cited
two principles of law, neither of which appears in the text of the Constitution,: “basic principles
of federalism” and the “principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.” 21 As for federalism,
that is hardly a barrier because the Voting Rights Act relied on the Fifteenth Amendment was
enacted specifically to prevent states from passing racially discriminatory voting laws and gives
Congress the authority to enforce it “by appropriate legislation.” Whatever weight federalism
may have in other contexts, it surely can have very little here. As for the principle of “equal
sovereignty,” those words do not appear in the Constitution, and whatever force that principle
may have, it was not sufficient for pre-Roberts Court Justices to overturn the Act when it was
previously before the Court. To the extent that there needed to be a textual support for rejecting
section 4, it was plainly lacking.
As for the other principal justification for Dobbs– deference to the legislature – Shelby
County was just the opposite. Although the majority went through the evidence adduced in the
extension hearings before Congress, both leading up to the 2007 amendments and those before
them, it concluded that Congress was, in effect, mistaken when it retained section 4 because that
provision was no longer necessary. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her dissent for Justices
Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan explained in great detail why the majority
was wrong and why the pre-clearance sections were still essential to prevent back-sliding and to
counteract new forms of discrimination. 22 But for these purposes, the point is not who was right
about necessity, but whether the majority did what Justice Alito said the Supreme Court should
do and defer to the judgment of the elected legislature. Plainly not. Moreover, it is hardly a

21
22

Id. at 535.
Id. at 563-66.

7

coincidence that the states that were covered before Shelby County are all Republican
strongholds that are now in a position to solidify their control of the state legislatures and
redistricting for the House of Representatives. 23
In 1976, in Buckley v. Valeo,24 the Court held that the First Amendment’s free speech
clause protected certain aspects of raising and spending money on campaigns for elected office,
on the theory that money is essential to campaigning for elected office today. The decision
nonetheless upheld limits on what individuals could contribute directly to candidates, but struck
down limits on what candidates could spend, and freed up individuals to make independent
expenditures in any amount that they chose, as long as they did not coordinate with the
candidate.
Money is not mentioned in the First Amendment, but it is hard to quarrel with the Court’s
conclusion regarding the vital role that it plays in the ability of candidates to get their messages
out, which is surely one of the highest forms of political speech. On the deference side, the
Court was rightly concerned that, if it deferred to the wishes of Congress, and severely limited
the amount a challenger could spend, and I would thereby “handicap a candidate who lacked
substantial name recognition or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign” i.e., help
incumbents who wrote the law setting the ceiling. 25
Opponents of the parts of the law that the Court sustained sought to explore potential
loopholes, and Congress responded with efforts to close them. One limit on campaign spending

Those states are those originally covered in 1965 - Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Virginia – as well as those added later – Alaska, Arizona, and Texas – id. at 537-538. In 2007, with the exception
of Virginia, they were controlled by the political party whose President nominated each of the Justices in the Shelby
County majority.
24
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
25
424 U.S. at 635.
23
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that had existed since 1907 was a ban on corporations making direct contributions to candidates
or political parties, which had been expanded in 1947 to include independent expenditures.
Most, but not, all states had similar rules regarding corporate spending when Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission,26came before the Roberts Court. As the dissent of Justice John
Paul Stevens pointed out, there were many ways that the case could have been decided for the
plaintiff on narrow grounds,27 but instead the majority reached out and overturned the principle
that spending by for-profit corporations could be treated differently from spending by
individuals. There is, of course, no mention of corporations making campaign expenditures in
the First Amendment or any other place in the Constitution, and there was no structural reason
why the judgments of Congress and numerous state legislatures that campaign contributions by
business corporations should be banned, or at least limited, should not be sustained, which are
the two reasons why Dobbs rejected a constitutional basis for a right to an abortion.
Furthermore, there can be no question as to the alignment between the outcome in Citizens
United and the Republican party because the Republican Leader in the Senate, Mitch
McConnell, has been at the forefront of every recent challenge to campaign finance limitations.28
Just this term, in Federal Election Commission v. Cruz,29 the Court further extended its
willingness to strike down various forms of prophylactic measures designed to prevent actual
corruption or the appearance of corruption in campaign financing. The provision at issue

558 U.S. 310 (2011).
558 U.S. at 404-08.
28
The Court has, so far, declined to decide whether the ban on candidate contributions, as opposed to independent
expenditures, is constitutional. United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2011), cert denied, 568 U.S.
1193 (2013). For a view that the explosion in campaign spending is not primarily due to Citizens United, but rather
to the ruling in Buckley that prohibited all limits on independent expenditures by individuals, see Alan B. Morrison,
McCutcheon v. FEC, Roberts v. Breyer: They’re Both Right, They’re Both Wrong, ACS Online 2014.
26
27

29

142 S. Ct. 1638 (2022).
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focused on money raised by federal candidates after they had won an election. It did not place
any new limits on the amounts or sources of that money, but it did impose a cap of $250,000 on
how much of the post-victory money could be used by candidates to pay off money that they had
personally loaned to their campaigns, on the theory that the excess “campaign donations” would
go right into the pockets of the winners, who would then be indebted to the donors for personally
enriching them.
What makes this decision (written by the Chief Justice) so inconsistent with the “leave it
to the elected representatives” theme in Dobbs is that this law was approved by the very same
members of Congress who are likely to be most adversely affected by it. Thus, in contrast to
some campaign finance laws, this provision would directly harm the members who voted for it.
The reason is simple: the candidates who receive post-election contributions are typically only
the winners of elections, and since most incumbents win re-election, their votes in support of this
legislation was a vote against self-interest, yet the Court said, in effect, we know better, and the
law cannot stand.
However, the Roberts Court has been anything but activist when the result would injure
the Republican Party, as it generally does in redistricting disputes. The Court’s ruling in Baker
v. Carr30 and the cases that followed it have found workable solutions to the problem of unequal
numbers of residents in comparable legislative districts, by more or less strictly imposing a
requirement of “one person, one vote.” But the Justices have struggled and failed to solve the
gerrymandering problem in which, while the number of voters are equal, the lines have been
drawn by partisan legislatures to produce outcomes that strongly favor the political party in

30

369 U.S. 182 (1963).
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power, generally, although not always, the Republican Party. It is not as if the Justices believe
that partisan gerrymandering is constitutional; they concluded just the opposite in Veith v.
Jubelirer.31 Instead, the Justice have concluded, most recently in Rucho v. Common Cause,32
that they are incapable of devising a remedy that did not involve the Court in making the kind of
political choices that federal courts are forbidden from making under the political question
doctrine.33
Unlike the other cases, this one involves an excess of “judicial inactivism.” The problem,
according to the Court, is its inability to draw lines in a manner that is judicially defensible and
does not make the courts into political institutions. As the Chief Justice stated in his conclusion,
“we have no commission to allocate political power and influence in the absence of a
constitutional directive or legal standards to guide us in the exercise of such authority.” 34 But as
Justice Kagan pointed out in her Rucho dissent, there are multiple ways that a court could review
claims of partisan gerrymandering and at least strike down the most egregious among them. 35
Indeed, no court need actually draw the district lines, but instead it can send the case back to the
legislature or other body charged with drawing the lines and order it do it again (and again) until
they get it right or at least not wrong. Attacking partisan gerrymandering does not require
perfection, but it can surely produce re-drawn lines that do less harm to fundamental principles
of democracy than do highly partisan gerrymanders, Democratic and Republican as there were in
Rucho’s two cases. More fundamentally, as Chief Justice John Marshall said in Marbury v

561 U.S. 267, 292 (2004).
139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
33
Even in Rucho, as Justice Kagan showed in her dissent, the majority conceded that partisan gerrymanders were
inconsistent with democratic principles. 139 S. Ct. at 2512.
34
Id. at 2508.
35
Id. at 2516-23.
31
32
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Madison,36 “It is a settled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a
remedy, and every injury its proper redress.” And even if that Chief Justice overstated his point
a little, he was surely correct in admonishing the courts that when it comes to remedies, the
perfect should not the enemy of the good, and at least the courts should be able to make the
situation better, or less bad, than it was before.
Although not in a case involving election law, the Roberts Court (minus the Chief
Justice) this fall was overcome by another case of judicial inactivism. Thus, in Whole Women’s
Health v. Jackson,37 the majority refused to block the Texas law that created a system of
exclusively private enforcement of its ban on all abortions after six weeks. The six-week ban
plainly violated existing abortion law, although that is no longer true post-Dobbs. The author of
the Texas law and the members of the Texas legislature that supported it embraced the fact that it
was designed to chill doctors from performing abortions that were currently constitutionally
protected by preventing any judicial review in federal court, with the only court review available
in a case against a doctor who had violated the Texas law. As shown by the opinions of the
Chief Justice,38 and Justice Sonia Sotomayor, 39 both of which were dissents from the principal
rulings, there were a number of paths to immediate federal court review, although some would
require extending existing doctrine in ways that had never been used before. But any extension
would be necessary because there had never been a law like this, whose principal goal was to
deter conduct that was currently constitutionally protected. The majority did leave open one
possible state law means to obtain court review, but the Fifth Circuit, not surprisingly, referred

5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803)
142 S. Ct. 522 (2021).
38
Id. at 543.
39
Id. at 545.
36
37
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the question to the Texas Supreme Court, which promptly closed that door.40 The majority’s
willingness to leave the Texas law in place can be explained (but not justified) by the fact that
the Justices had already concluded, but not announced, that Roe was dead, and there was no
reason to prolong its life.
Undermining Labor Unions
It is no secret that the Republican Party, as the party of business, has long opposed all
efforts to strengthen the ability of workers to bargain collectively for wages and conditions of
employment. In order for there to be vibrant labor unions, they must have the ability to require
workers to pay agency fees (for those who do not wish to join the union) to support the union’s
work on their behalf regarding wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment. Although
most of the members’ mandatory dues and fees are spent to protect the economic interests of the
workers, some unions used a portion of that money to support political, electoral, and social
campaigns that not all members supported. In 1977, the Court in Abood v. Detroit Bd of Educ.,
41

upheld the basic right of unions (in this case of public employees) to collect agency fees from

those non-members that it represented. However, it also ruled that using any portion of those
fees used for political expenditures violated the First Amendment rights of those who disagreed
with the causes that the union leaders supported. It then required unions to set up rebate systems
to accommodate those who chose not to be members, but who were required by law to pay their
fair share of the non-political expenses of the union. The constitutional argument that prevailed
for the objectors was that forcing workers to pay for political causes which they opposed was a
form of compelled speech forbidden by the First Amendment. And while state legislatures for

40
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Whole Women’s Health v. Jackson, 642 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2021).
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state employees had enacted laws requiring workers to pay dues or an equivalent, those laws did
not specifically approve collecting and spending money for political and other purposes
unrelated to collective bargaining. 42
Abood and subsequent decisions left in place a system that, while not ideal for the unions,
provided a tolerable accommodation. In addition, Congress in 1947, in the Taft-Hartley Act, had
authorized states to enact “Right-to-Work” laws, under which individuals could not be required
to join or even support a union as a condition of their employment, thus making it much harder
for unions to organize and fund their activities on behalf of their members in Right-to-Work
states. But the anti-unionists were not satisfied, and so they sought and obtained further relief
from the Roberts Court. In Janus v. AFSCME,43 the Court, in another opinion by Justice Alito,
following a series of cases in which the Abood rules gave increasing protection to objecting
workers, extended the First Amendment to create a defense to workers who did not want to pay
any money to support even the collective bargaining activities of all workers, overruling the part
of Abood that sided with the union.
The basis for the complaint was that the plaintiffs objected strongly to the positions that
their union took in collective bargaining against the state, including those on behalf of the
economic benefits for the workers that it represented. The Court concluded that the First
Amendment protection extended to the right to oppose economic benefits that the union obtained
for all the workers, and so the objecting plaintiffs did not have to pay their fair share of the costs
of obtaining them. Although the Court eliminated the obligation of objectors to pay for any

Abood involved a state law applied to state employees. Subsequently, the Court applied the Abood principal to
workers in the private sector whose unions were established and given the right to collect dues by Congress.
Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
43
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
42
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portion of the union’s collective bargaining activities, it did not lessen the union’s duty to treat
all workers fairly, whether they contributed financially or not. There is, of course, no
“constitutional right to free-ride” mentioned in the First Amendment, and the results are directly
the opposite of what the elected representatives who enacted collective bargaining laws
provided.44 The result is just the opposite of the two principal bases in which the Dobbs opinion
overturned Roe, but the anti-union outcome is exactly what the Republican Party wanted.
Another example involves the portion of the Fifth Amendment that prohibits
governments from “taking private property for public purposes” without paying “just
compensation.” The Court has correctly realized that some intrusions other than the government
acquiring ownership or seizing physical possession of a person’s land or other property may be
so disruptive as to prevent the owner from being able to fully use it. On the other hand, the
Court has also upheld laws that impose reasonable regulations on the way that owners may use
their property.45 Similarly, no one would doubt the right of the government to enter private
property temporarily to assure that the owner is complying with generally applicable laws.
The issue in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,46 was whether a California law that allowed
union organizers to make limited visits to a farm to urge workers to join their union constituted
the “taking” of the owner’s property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. There was no claim
that those visits actually interfered with the owner’s ability to engaging in farming, that they
deprived the owner of the use of any physical space while the organizers were on the premises,
or that the owner suffered any monetary damage or loss of income from their presence (other

Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry, Airline & SS Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 438, 446-48 (1984) (Congress intended to
eliminate free-riders).
45
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
46
141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021).
44
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than the possible loss of income if the workers organized and obtained higher wages). Nor was
there a claim that the state permitted an unreasonably large number of visits by the organizers.
According to the majority opinion of the Chief Justice, the repeated entrances constituted a
trespass and hence an unconstitutional taking, even though the California legislators had reached
a contrary conclusion and even though the state had “taken” nothing from the owner, other than
the ability to exclude union organizers from using a small portion of the property for a short
period of time. And, like the other cases, the California law was opposed by the business
interests that support the Republican Party whose Presidents appointed the Justices who struck
down the California law.
Other Cases of the Roberts Court & Judicial Activism
In 2020 and 2021, the Roberts Court, in keeping with the Federalist Society wing of the
Republican Party, moved ahead on a long-standing policy of theirs – giving greater power to the
President vs the administrative agencies under the “Unitary Executive” theory. In the first case,
Seila Law v Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 47 with the Chief Justice writing for the
majority, the Court held that the statute that limited the ability of the President to remove the
head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), except for good cause, was
unconstitutional because it interfered with the ability of the President to carry out his
constitutional obligation in Article I, section 3 to “take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”
There is no mention of the power to remove officers in either the Take Care or the
Appointments Clauses, although that term is found in the Impeachment Clause. The director of

47

140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
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CFPB and the other officers who have good cause requirements for removal are recent creations
of Congress, and so there is no long-standing tradition that was offended when Congress
specifically decided that no President should have the power to remove those officers at will. It
is only at the highest level of generality that the text of the Take Care Clause can be said to
create something approaching an absolute power of the President to remove those officers on the
theory that, if he cannot, he will be held accountable for the maladministration of their agencies
and thereby interfere with his Take Care responsibilities. 48 As for Justice Alito’s reliance on
deference to the legislature in Dobbs, it is plain that Congress balanced the considerations for
and against good cause removal and came to the opposite judgment from the one adopted by the
Roberts Court.
At issue in second case in which the Roberts Court relied on an expansive reading of the
Constitution is United States v. Arthrex,49 was a statute that assigned the duty to assess the
validity of patents being challenged before the Patent & Trademark Office to administrative
patent judges (APJs), who are appointed by the head of their department, the Secretary of
Commerce. Relying again on the Take Care Clause, which does not “mention” patents or the use
of administrative law judges, the Chief Justice concluded that the entire review process was
invalid unless the decisions were made by, or subject to approval of, principal officers,50 i.e.,
those who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, as set forth
in the Appointments Clause. 51 However, that same Clause also allows Congress to pass laws
providing for the appointment of “such inferior Officers as they think proper,” without Senate
confirmation. However, the Court concluded that it had the final say on whether an officer who
140 S. Ct. at 2197-98, 2203-04.
141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021).
50
141 S. Ct. at 1978-79.
51
Art. II, sec, 2, cl. 2.
48
49
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performed certain functions, had to be a principal officer, regardless of what Congress had
decided in the law creating the office. In this instance, not only was there no textual basis for
insisting on presidential control over basic administrative procedures, but the text of the
Appointments Clause points in the direction of giving specific deference to Congress – “as they
think proper” – when it assigns a duty to an inferior rather than a principal officer.
In addition to its expansive reading of the free speech clause in Janus, the Roberts Court
has also used that clause to advance other ends of the business community which the Republican
Party generally supports. For example, consider Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.52 When doctors
write prescriptions, the pharmacies keep records of the drugs prescribed. There is often more
than one drug that a doctor can prescribe for a given ailment, and naturally drug companies
would prefer that doctors prescribe one of their own. One way to increase the likelihood of that
happening is for the company to send out representatives to visit doctors and try to sell them on
the company’s products. Some doctors may say that they prescribe one drug to a company
representative, but not always follow through. One way that the companies can verify what a
doctor is telling its salespeople is by gaining access to the records of the pharmacy which will
give the company a very good idea of each doctor’s prescribing practices.
Vermont decided that allowing pharmacies to provide such information to the drug
companies was a bad idea, even though the practice did not give the companies any personal
information about the identity of the patients. The doctors did not like being confronted with the
records of their prescribing practice, and the Vermont legislature agreed with them, making it
unlawful to provide that information. The data companies that collected the prescription
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information and sold it to the drug companies, claimed that the prohibition violated the First
Amendment, and the Roberts Court agreed in Sorrell.
Although on its face, and according to the dissent of Justice Breyer, the Vermont law was
no more than “a lawful government effort to regulate a commercial enterprise,” 53 but that is not
how the Roberts Court saw it. According to the majority, the law interfered with the free speech
rights of the pharmacists, who wished to sell the prescription data, and the comparable rights to
receive the information by the drug companies. The problem is not that freedom of speech is not
mentioned in the Constitution; the problem is that the Court, in an effort to side with business at
the expenses of doctors and others whom the Vermont legislature sought to protect, the majority
greatly expanded the concept of freedom of speech to include basic economic regulation. By
relying on the First Amendment, the Court was able to avoid a charge that they were relying on
substantive due process (as in Roe) to achieve their desired political result, which, to no one’s
surprise, was the outcome favored by the Republican Party and its big business allies and
opposed by the Obama administration.
The Roberts Court has also taken an expansive view of the free exercise clause in the
First Amendment, at least as applied to expanding the protections available to mainstream
religions. Public education is an important responsibility of the states. The Court has long held
that parents have a constitutional right to send their children to schools of their choosing,
including religious schools, provided that the schools meet minimum state standards. Montana
has a provision in its constitution that forbids the state from spending state funds to support
religious schools. Several years ago, the state decided that, for a variety of reasons, it needed to
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support private schools to supplement the state’s public secondary school system by providing
for tax credits for the parents of students who attended certain eligible private schools.
Consistent with the state constitution, no funds were available if the school was a religious-based
one, and the denial of tax credits for donations to religious schools was challenged in Espinoza v.
Montana Department of Revenue. 54 The Roberts Court sided with the three parents who argued
that Montana was discriminating against religion thereby interfering with the parents’ “free
exercise” of their religion. From a text perspective, Montana did not interfere with the religious
practices or beliefs of any person; it defended the case on the ground that the parents had no
constitutional right to have the state subsidize the education of their children at a religious
school. But the Roberts Court ruled that if the state were going to support private schools, it
could not exclude otherwise qualified religious institutions, even though the state’s constitution
and the wishes of the citizens of Montana were to the contrary.55
Finally, although decided before three current members of the Roberts Court majority
were appointed, the Second Amendment decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,56 is another
example of an activist and non-textual interpretation of the Constitution when it served the
political ends of the Republican Party. The extent of the protection of the right to bear arms in
that Amendment has a significant ambiguity: how far does that right extend, and what deference
should legislative determinations be given when states and localities seek to control the
possession of certain arms in certain places? The meaning of the introductory militia clause that
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confirm the longstanding American tradition that religious individuals and institutions can educate young people . . .
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is expressly included (mentioned) in that Amendment – “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State” - has been fully debated in the opinions in Heller and
elsewhere. But for purposes of this essay, it only needs to be noted that the majority read the
eleven words as functionally irrelevant. 57 Moreover, from the perspective of the second rationale
for eliminating any constitutional basis for the right to an abortion in Dobbs - the lack of
deference to the judgment of elected legislators – that was also present, but given short shrift in
Heller. The District of Columbia’s judgment that handguns were a major source of crimes in
that urban setting and that the District’s residents should be entitled to protect themselves in
ways that other jurisdictions would find unnecessary, was simply disregarded because the “right”
at issue was inconsistent with the Justices view of the role of privately owned firearms in our
society – and that of the Republican Party.58
CONCLUSION
A word about the limitations of the claims made in this essay. First, United States v.
Windsor59 and Obergefell v. Hodges60 are Roberts Court decisions in which the judicial activism
side produced results contrary to the positions of the Republican Party. But there is an
explanation for those outcomes that does not undermine the thesis of this essay: Justice Anthony
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Kennedy provided the deciding vote to strike down the laws in both cases that disfavored same
sex couples, and he is no longer on the Court.
Second, the cases discussed in this essay do not include any criminal or statutory cases,
which make up the bulk of the Court’s docket. And within the criminal docket, there are
constitutional claims by defendants that may be viewed as seeking a result that some would see
as judicial activist. My view is that including those cases would not alter the conclusions of this
essay, but I recognize that further study of them might lead to another conclusion.
Third, I do not suggest that I have reviewed all of the constitutional decisions of the
Roberts Court in civil cases or that they can all be explained in the manner described above.
This essay examines only a few decisions, albeit important and controversial ones, and there are
many others that may not fit this pattern, although not many that contradict it.
With those qualifications, I believe that the implicit charge against Roe – that it is a
product of judicial activism – can also be made against many of the most important and most
controversial decisions of the Roberts Court. If the charge of judicial activism can properly be
based on a combination of an absence of textual support in the Constitution and a lack of
deference to the decisions of the legislatures, then the Roberts Court has been as guilty of that
charge on the same grounds that majority opinion in Dobbs found the decision in Roe to be.
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ABSTRACT
SELECTIVE JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
IN THE ROBERTS COURT
In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Justice Samuel Alito offers two main
reasons why there is no Due Process right to an abortion in the Constitution, and hence why Roe
v. Wade should be overturned: abortion is not mentioned in the text, and decisions about whether
abortions should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions, are properly the province of the
elected representatives and not federal judges. In this essay I show that, in many of the most
significant cases decided by the Roberts Court, the Court has disregarded both of those reasons,
and engaged in the kind of judicial activism it decried in Roe, in order to reach results that are
favored by the Republican Party, whose Presidents have appointed the Justices that comprise the
majority of the Roberts Court.
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